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DRAFTING DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS
D. H.

REDFEARN*

Fifty years ago a lawyer could do a creditable job of drafting a will
or trust instrument with very little knowledge of his client's business
affairs. The draftsman of that day was primarily concerned with
stating his client's wishes in clear and unambiguous language. In
this age of complex taxation and complicated business interests, however, the lawyer must give careful attention to many technical matters
in connection with his client's property and business. For example, in
preparing the dispositive provisions of a will or trust instrument the
draftsman should note particularly the manner in which the testator
owns his property, whether outright or conditionally, individually,
jointly, or in partnership. Consideration should be given to the
specific types of property interests, such as property held in trust for
him, anticipated inheritances, future interests, and powers of appointment.' Not to be ignored are the absolute debts and contingent liabilities of the testator, his past and present marital status, his obligations under prenuptial and separation agreements, and many facts
about the members of his family and others for whom he wishes to
provide.
Although there is no legal requirement that the language employed in a will or trust instrument be free from grammatical errors,
an attorney invites litigation when he fails to express in correct, modern
English, without ambiguity or redundancy, every instrument he prepares. The use of correct grammar tends to free an instrument from
ambiguities and usually creates a favorable impression upon those
whose task is to interpret and enforce it. A well-expressed pleading or
brief may be a great aid in winning a case, but a legal document containing poor spelling, improper punctuation, incorrect capitalization,
and bad grammar brands the writer as partly illiterate. This may result in the loss of valuable business, since a client seldom desires to
retain an attorney whom he considers poorly educated in fundamentals.2
*B.S. 1910, LL.B. 1909, University of Georgia; Author of WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA; Member of Miami, Florida, Bar.

'See Note, infra p. 545.
23 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 19 (1950): "[I]t can hardly be insisted on too often or
too vigorously that language at its best is always a defective and uncertain instru-

[5131
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Although it may be true as a general rule that lawyers indulge in
verbiage, they probably err in the opposite direction when drafting
dispositive provisions. A sketchily drafted provision or instrument indicates incompleteness of thought and failure to anticipate future
contingencies. For example, the phrase "to my children" has the merit
of being brief, but it is subject to several meanings and is one of the
great breeders of litigation. At the expense of a little more time and
thought the draftsman could have stated the intended provision accurately and precisely. The consequences of such brevity are too costly
to be ignored.
Another hazardous tendency is the indiscriminate use of forms.
Forms, properly used, can be of valuable assistance to the draftsman.
They contain, however, limitations and inadequacies that should be
recognized and compensated for. Forms are necessarily prepared on
the basis of an average situation; they rarely reflect the individual
needs of a particular client. The careful attorney will use a form as a
basic working plan, to be studied and analyzed with the desires of
his client in mind. Parts inapplicable or ambiguous will be deleted,
and other parts will be added or expanded. The end product of this
tailoring process is the transformation of a form for the "average"
purpose into an integrated instrument calculated to serve its function
adequately.
TROUBLESOME DRAFTING

AREAs

Rule in Wild's Case
Prior to 1600 the word "children" had a definite meaning that
always prevailed in the construction of wills unless qualifying or explanatory words or expressions were included to indicate the testator's
contrary intent. In the absence of explanatory language the term was
construed as one of purchase and not of limitation, that is, it identified
the persons who were to take the property and not the estate transferred by the instrument. On the other hand, recognized words of
limitation in a grant or devise, such as "heirs of the body," "heirs male
or female," "heirs by John Corkshire," and "issue," created an express
estate tail unless a contrary intent could be gathered from the context
of the instrument.
ment, that words do not define themselves, that terms and sentences in a contract,
a deed, or a will do not apply themselves to external objects and performances ......
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An exception to the established meaning of the word "children"
as a word of purchase came into being as a result of the Wild's Case,3
decided in England in 1600. It held that a devise or grant to a person
and his "children" created an estate tail if there were no children in
being at the time the transfer took effect. Under these circumstances,
therefore, the word "children" was thenceforth to be considered as one
of limitation. If, however, there were children in being at the time the
transfer was effected, the word was assigned its customary meaning as
a word of purchase and an estate tail would not be created.
The Rule in Wild's Case is in force in Florida;4 however, a statute 5
prohibiting estates tail destroys an express estate tail created through
the operation of the rule and creates a life estate in the transferee,
with a remainder per stirpes in fee to his lineal descendents living at
the time of his death. When the rule does not create an estate tail,
that is, when there are children living at the time of transfer, the
transferee and each of his children take as tenants in common. Parol
evidence is admissible to prove whether children were in being at the
crucial time.
The rule is applicable only when the word "children" is coupled
with the name of the parent without further qualification; if the transfer is to Jones for life, remainder to his children, the rule is inapplicable and the obvious intent is effectuated. Because of the double
meaning of the word in Florida, the draftsman should exercise extreme caution when employing the term in a will, deed, or other
instrument of conveyance.
Rule Against Perpetuities
A thorough understanding of the Rule Against Perpetuities is vital
in the drafting of wills or trust instruments. Unless an instrument
meets the requirements of the rule a remote interest will fail; the
draftsman holds the balance in his hands.
The Rule Against Perpetuities requires that a future interest or
estate in personal or real property vest during the period comprised
within a life or lives in being at the time of its creation plus twenty-one
years and the usual period of gestation. 6 Under this rule there is
316 Coke 16b, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (1600).
-'Cf. McLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 427 (1861).
5FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1955).
GSee Smith and Keathley, Future Interests in Florida,9 U. FLA. L. REv. 123 (1956).
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theoretically no restriction as to the number-of lives that may be
chosen as long as they are reasonably ascertainable. For practical reasons, however, the draftsman should discourage the use of so large a
number as to be unwieldy. If the testator elects to shorten the standard
of measurement by not using the time of the life or lives in being and
uses an absolute period of years, this period cannot exceed twenty-one
years. 7 Also, the period of twenty-one years may not precede the
measuring lives.
The Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to vested estates or
interests but only to remote contingent estates and interests, legal or
equitable. A future interest or estate is invalid unless there is absolute
certainty that it will vest within the period prescribed by the rule.8
Strong possibility of vesting or the subsequent occurrence of events to
vest the interest is not enough. Consequently, the draftsman should
satisfy himself that there is no possibility of failure to vest within the
proper time. When the testator attempts to create a perpetuity, that is,
a remote interest that violates the rule, the law invalidates the remote
interests and gives effect to limitations not too remote. But if the remote interests are so related to the legal limitations that the two are
inseparable parts of a general plan, the legal as well as the remote
limitations may be declared void, 9 since in this case to destroy one
without destroying the other would defeat the dominant purpose of
the testator.
The draftsman should remember that the Rule Against Perpetuities also applies to the creation of future interests or estates through
the exercise of powers of appointment. 0 Whether an estate created by
the exercise of a testamentary power of appointment is too remote and
therefore void under the Rule Against Perpetuities must be determined, according to the weight of authority in the United States,
from the date of the creation of the power and not from the date of
its execution." A power created in a will becomes operative and is
considered to be created at the time of the testator's death rather than
at the time of the execution of the will. 12 The careful draftsman can
'Crawford v. Carlisle, 206 Ala. 379, 89 So. 565 (1921); Cawthon v. Steams Culver
Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 733 (1910); 1 PERRY, TRUSTS §380 (7th ed. 1921).
s8uld v. Washington Hospital, 95 U.S. 303 (1877).
9Moroney v. Haas, 277 Ill. 467, 115 N.E. 648 (1917); 75 A.L.R. 124 (1931).
?oSt. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569 (1935).
141 Ari. JUR., Powers §83 (1942).
12Schaefer v. Voyle, 88 Fla. 170, 102 So. 7 (1924); Colcord v. Conroy, 40 Fla. 97,
23 So. 561 (1898).
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give effect to most of the desires of the testator or grantor without
violating the Rule Against Perpetuities provided he thoroughly understands the rule and considers its possible operation in every section of
the instrument.
Restraints on Alienation
The Rule Against Perpetuities is concerned only with the vesting or
commencing of a future interest or estate and is to be distinguished
from the rule against restraints on alienation, which is concerned
with the duration of the interest or estate created. When the rule
against restraints on alienation is violated, the interest or estate created is not void as it is when the Rule Against Perpetuities is violated;
instead, the interest is freed from the restraint and its enjoyment is
accelerated.' 3 The rule against restraints on alienation applies to
life estates 14 as well as to fee simple estates. It also applies to personal

property and to equitable estates.15 Since one of the incidents of the
ownership of property is the right to convey it, neither a grantor nor
a testator will be allowed to dispose of property and to maintain control over its future alienation at the same time. There is a generally
recognized exception to this rule in the case of spendthrift trusts, 6
but otherwise the draftsman should view restrictions with caution and
attempt to discourage the owner from imposing disabling restraints.
PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR PROVISIONS

Marital Deduction
The marital deduction section 7 of the Internal Revenue Code
permits the deduction from the gross estate of the value of property
"passing" from the decedent to the surviving spouse in an amount not
exceeding fifty per cent of the adjusted gross estate. This provision,
13Story v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
24McCleary v. Ellis, 54 Iowa 311, 6 N.W. 571 (1880); Bank of Powhattan v.
Rooney, 146 Kan. 559, 72 P.2d 993 (1937).
1'Reimer v. Smith, 105 Fla. 671, 142 So. 603 (1932).
loNichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
17INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2056. When the assets of a husband and wife are

approximately equal, it may be best not to provide for a marital deduction in
either estate. If assets are unequal, some gain is usually available by taking a
marital deduction in the larger estate.
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like most others in the code, fairly bristles with limitations and terms
of art that are not appropriate for discussion here. For present purposes it is enough to point out that the maximum benefit of this allowance is not obtained by making at the time of drafting the will a
calculated prediction as to the size of the adjusted gross estate. Moreover, it is not necessary to guess. The marital deduction provision in
the will may pass the precise deductible value in property to the surviving spouse outright, or in trust if the section's limitations are borne
in mind, if it simply states that the property so passing shall be in that
amount.' s
Remainder Interests
A remainder is an estate created by will or deed' 9 that takes effect
in possession immediately upon expiration of a prior estate created
at the same time and by the same instrument.20 It is vested when
limited to an indentifiable person upon the happening of a necessary
event that must take place before the termination of the preceding
limited estate. 21 It is contingent if the person who is to enjoy the estate
is presently unidentifiable, 22 or if the estate is to vest only upon the
occurrence of an event that may not happen before the termination
of the preceding estate. 23 The contingency must occur before or upon
isFor an illustration of this device see Item IV of the appendix to this article.
19jordan v. Jordan, 274 I1. 251, 113 N.E. 631 (1916); see Phillips v. Phillips, 186
Ala. 545, 65 So. 49 (1914).
20Adams v. Adams 147 Fla. 267, 2 So.2d 855 (1941); Commercial Bldg. Co. v.
Parslow, 93 Fla. 143, 112 So. 378 (1927).
2"Smaw v. Young, 109 Ala. 528, 20 So. 370 (1896); Travis v. Ashton, 156 Fla.
529, 23 So.2d 725 (1945); Hill v. Hill, 264 Ill. 219, 106 N.E. 262 (1914). An example
of a clause creating a vested remainder would be "to B for life, then to C and his
heirs." The estate given to C is vested, since it necessarily follows immediately
after termination of the preceding estate, that is, at B's death.
22An example of a contingent interest resulting from unidentifiable takers is
"to B for life, then to the heirs of C." The heirs of C cannot be ascertained until C
dies; since C is presently alive and may be alive at B's death, the remainder is
contingent, for the heirs cannot be identified until C's death, which may not occur
until after B's death.
"3Doe v. Considine, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 458 (1868); Rewis v. Rewis, 79 Fla. 126,
84 So. 93 (1920); Kingsley v. Broward, 19 Fla. 722 (1883); Northern Trust Co. v.
Wheaton, 249 Ill. 606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911). An example of a contingency that may
not occur before termination of the preceding estate is "to B for life, then to C if
he survives D." The remainder is contingent, since C and D are presently alive and
may be alive at the termination of B's estate; thus the remainder may not vest in
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the termination of the preceding estate; if it does not occur prior to
that time the remainder is destroyed under the common law destructibility doctrine.24 If a remainder interest is transferred to a person subject to divestment upon the occurrence of an event that may take place,
the condition is subsequent and not precedent; in this situation the
remainder is vested and not contingent.25
Remainders may be created for persons not in being -G or not ascertained. Such a remainder is contingent, but when a person answering the description of the remainderman comes into being during the
existence of the prior estate the remainder is no longer contingent; it
becomes vested immediately, subject to being opened for all persons
within the description coming into being up to the time the remainder
7
commences as an estate in possession.There are several important restrictions on the creation of remainder interests that if violated may produce results adverse to the
intentions of the would-be creator. The requirement of simultaneousness of the creation of the prior estate and the latter estate must be met.
This is usually accomplished by creating both estates in the same
instrument; however, this requirement apparently is also met if the
prior estate is created in a will and the remainder in a codicil to that
will. Anything less than this would fail to create a remainder. Likewise, a remainder cannot follow a purported gift of the entire estate
owned by the transferor, since the subsequent interest must necessarily divest the preceding estate. 28 If an inter vivos transfer is not
executed with the formality required in the execution of wills, a

possession at B's death. If the remainder cannot vest in possession at B's death
because C and D are both alive, the remainder is destroyed. See note 26 infra.
24See Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931); for a thorough discussion of the doctrine see Smith, Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in
Florida,3 U. FLA. L. REv. 319 (1950).
25For example, "to B for life, then to C and his heirs, but if C predeceases B,
then to B and his heirs." C has a vested remainder, since his interest immediately
follows the termination of B's estate. It is subject to divestment by the executory
interest in B if C predeceases B.
26Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937).
2-1For example, "to B and his heirs, but if B predeceases C, then to C and his
heirs." C has an executory interest that is in derogation of the fee simple grants
to B; it must therefore divest the preceding estate, since it does not vest at the
termination of the preceding estate. For a discussion of executory interests see Simas
and Shirrn, LAW op FuTuRE IrNrraaErs cc. 6, 7 (2d ed. 1956); see also Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HAgv.L. Rav. 638 (1938).
2
sSee SiMris and SmrrH, op. cit. supra note 27, §134.
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reversionary interest is created in the original transferor if the vesting
of a remainder is postponed until after his death, since the delay makes
29
the transfer testamentary.
Although the foregoing terminology may seem clear and simple
when considered abstractly or in a vacuum, it becomes far less so
when applied to concrete facts. Considering the difficulty courts have
experienced in drawing a line of demarcation between these terms,
the conscientious draftsman will realize that here is another point
where ambiguous language and careless expression cannot be used.
Failure to indicate clearly the particular type of interest intended may
result in an adverse construction, possibly resulting in differing legal
consequences. For example, if the testator intends that the beneficiary
take a vested remainder but, because of an erroneously placed condition, it is construed to be a contingent remainder, the interest will
be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities; it may be destroyed under
the destructibility doctrine and may be alienable. 30 Conversely, if a
contingent remainder is intended, the draftsman should spell out
the contingency, for the courts have generally resolved ambiguity with
the presumption that favors vested remainders. If a vested remainder is
desirable, the draftsman, by a carefully prepared clause, can probably
create it rather than a contingent remainder, even though a contingency is set forth. 3'
Class Gifts
Compared with the niceties of drafting a class gift provision,
the problems of drafting a disposition of specific property to specific
persons are relatively few. The gravity of the draftsman's responsibility in stating the terms of a class gift is manifested by the floundering
of the courts in their attempts to interpret these provisions. An intelligent discussion of class gifts might very properly be the subject
29Scorr, 3 LAW OF TRUSTS §330.4 (2d ed. 1956), says: "If the owner of property
transfers it to a trustee but no interest, vested or contingent, passes before his death
to any beneficiary other than himself, the trust is testamentary, and he can at any
time revoke it."
30Assume that the testator desires that C take only if he survives B, the life
tenant. A grant "to B for life, then to C if he survives B" would create a contingent
remainder. A vested remainder may be given to C by providing "to B for life, then
to C and his heirs, but if C predeceases B, then to the heirs of D." See note 25 supra
and accompanying text.
31Doe v. Considine, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 458 (1868).
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of a major article; only a few of the problems that have been productive
of litigation will be pointed up in this section. It is axiomatic that
most of these problems can be avoided by careful draftsmanship.
One of the major problems that has confronted courts is the determination of the persons who are to be included in the class.
This usually is brought about by the widespread use of such terms as
"heirs," 32 "heirs of the body," and "children," without the inclusion
of any qualifying definitions. Much of the confusion in this respect
could be eliminated by abandoning their usage or by properly defining them in the will. For example, the word "heirs" becomes a
more identifiable concept if provision is made that it be interpreted
in accordance with the intestate succession statute. It might also be
defined in some other manner, but the critical point is that it should
be defined whenever its use is attempted. When the word "children"
is used as the group designation, it also should be defined to include
or exclude adopted children, step-children, unborn children, and illegitimates.
Another troublesome question that can and should be settled by
the draftsman is the time when the transfer should vest. If the testator intends that a transfer take effect at a time later than his death,
his intent should be clearly delineated. The time at which the members of the class will be identified usually is the time fixed for vesting;
to resolve any doubt, this direction should be specifically stated.
Provision should be made for alternative dispositions, since it is
possible that none of the group will survive the date set for vesting.
This can be done by a savings clause.
Division of the property among the takers is another problem that
should be laid to rest by a specific direction in the will. The language
"share and share alike," "equally divided," and other similar words
frequently have been employed and just as frequently have been given
different constructions by the courts. Their use should be avoided.
In the absence of any direction in the will, courts generally have
favored a per stirpes distribution, which may be suitable in some
cases but in others may be completely contrary to the wishes of the
testator. It is therefore the responsibility of the draftsman not only
to provide for distribution but also to do so as clearly and precisely
as possible, whether this necessitates distribution per stirpes or per
capita, or by some other appropriate method.
22FLA. STAT. §731.02 (8) (1955). "Heir" and "heir at law" have the same meaning
as "next of kin."

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol9/iss4/6

10

Redfearn: Drafting Dispositive Provisions
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
It is quite possible that a member of the class will predecease the
testator. In the absence of any contrary intent of the testator, a deceased member's share usually passes to the surviving members. The
draftsman should expressly provide for disposition of any such share
according to the testator's wishes.
Inter Vivos Trusts33
The expense of administering a trust usually prevents its inclusion
in the plan for a small estate. The owner of an estate of considerable
size, however, usually is concerned about the future management and
disposition of his assets, and for that reason he may wish to establish
an inter vivos trust.
Revocable Trusts. There are certain advantages and disadvantages
in establishing a revocable trust. An elderly donor usually does not
desire to gamble with revocable trusts for several reasons. Among the
disadvantages are the following:
(1) The income is likely to be taxed to the settlor.
(2) The value of the trust is included in the settlor's gross
estate.
(3) In Florida revocable trust assets may be subject to the claims
of the settlor's creditors.
If the donor is young enough to gamble on living for a substantial
period of time, he may desire to make the trust revocable in order to
observe the conduct of the beneficiaries, thus allowing him to revoke or
modify the trust if his desires are being thwarted. Some of the advantages of a revocable trust are as follows:
(1) A trust under the control of the donor may be less expensive to operate than one over which the donor has surrendered control.
(2) The revocable trust controls disposition of the trust property unless it is revoked by will or other method.
(3) The donor can reserve the right to change trustees, add cotrustees, or implement or subtract from the trustees' powers.
(4) The trust can be made irrevocable by a simple release of
the donor's power to revoke.
33This discussion is not applicable to charitable trusts.
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(5) The donor can reserve the right to change beneficiaries
of the trust at any time.
(6) The trust assets can be changed, withdrawn in substitution, or enlarged.
Several drafting problems arise in connection with revocable inter
vivos trust agreements. Designation should be made of the portion
of estate, inheritance, and income taxes, if any, that are to be paid from
the trust estate as well as whether these payments are to be made from
the principal or income or both. The draftsman should specify whether
the trust estate is to be liable only for the taxes against the trust or
also be responsible for a share of the taxes levied against the estate
of the settlor.
Another pitfall that should be anticipated in the drafting stage
occurs when distributions are to be made to members of a groupchildren, for example - as each reaches a specified age. Alternative
dispositions should be made of the shares of those prospective takers
who do not reach the specified age. The donor may wish that each
portion devolve upon the heirs of the deceased beneficiary or that it
vest in pro rata shares to those whose right to actual payment is
ripened by time. Controversy over the time of payment might be
avoided by inclusion in the trust instrument of the birth dates of the
prospective beneficiaries, thus binding the trustee and saving him
from the trouble of independently establishing the dates on which the
various beneficiaries become entitled to payment. Care must also
be taken to avoid violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Irrevocable Trusts. If carefully created, irrevocable inter vivos
trusts not created in contemplation of death may escape taxation in
the estate of the donor.34 The chief disadvantage is that the donor
parts with the title to his property and thus loses control over it. The
trustee exercises economic control with the powers granted him by the
trust instrument and by the statutes of the State of Florida. If the
donor retains any power over the trust assets, they probably will be
taxed as a part of his estate when he dies. Therefore if an irrevocable
trust is to be created, the draftsman should meticulously separate the
donor from the title and all control incident thereto.
In 1951 the Legislature of Florida enacted the Florida Trust
Accounting Law, 35 which provides that a person named as trustee in
34See INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §2035.
35FLA. STAT. c. 737 (1955).
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a will cannot act until he has established his qualifications by a decree
of the circuit court; it further provides that he must make annual accountings to the court appointing him, thus making his qualifications
subject to annual inspection. Annual accountings may be waived in
certain instances.36 Although the law applies only to testamentary
trusts, it can be applied to inter vivos trusts by a requirement to that
effect in the trust instrument. This can be a useful device if the
settlor desires to insure continual qualifications of the trustee.
The author recently prepared a will for a client whose estate is
valued at approximately 5400,000. His wife has practically no assets
of her own. Since this will involves some of the problems discussed,
it is appended to this article, with fictitious names inserted. It is not
intended as a form to cover all contingencies, but it may be used as
a general testamentary form.

APPENDIX
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOHN DOE
I, JOHN DOE, of Dade County, Florida, being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, do make this, my last will and testament, hereby revoking and annulling
all others by me heretofore made.
I.
I desire and direct that my body be buried in a manner suitable to my circumstances in life and that all my just debts be paid without unnecessary delay by the
1
executor hereinafter named and appointed.
II.
I desire and direct that all estate and inheritance taxes chargeable against my
estate be paid by the executor out of the residuary assets of my estate, but not out
2
of the portion constituting the marital trust assets.
36FLA. STAT.

§737.12 (1955).

'It is immaterial whether the provisions of this paragraph are included in a
will, since the law requires disposal of the body and payment of debts anyway.
However, it pleases most testators to have these provisions in their wills. In some
instances the testator may desire that a sentence similar to the following be added:
"Any mortgage, lien, or other encumbrance upon any property bequeathed or devised hereunder, either outright or in trust, shall be assumed by the legatee or
devisee of such property."
2Under FLA. STAT. §734.041 (1955) all legacies are required to bear their proportionate part of the estate taxes unless the will directs otherwise. The same rule
applies to inter vivos trust instruments.
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III.
I give, bequeath, and devise unto my beloved wife, MARY DOE, the following
mentioned legacies, free from all debts and all kinds of taxes against my estate, and
free from all administration expenses:
(1) Seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) in cash, to be paid to her
by the executor at any time during the administration of my estate.
(2) Twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) to be paid to her by the executor
as soon as he qualifies, so as to assure her of having this amount as a
support during the administration of my estate; this is not to take the
place of any statutory allowance to which she is entitled under Florida
law.
(3) All household furniture and furnishings which I may own at the time
of my death and all my personal effects, clothing, and jewelry.
(4) A new, medium-priced automobile of her selection; the executor of my
will shall purchase such automobile and pay for it out of the residuary
trust hereinafter mentioned and deliver it to her during the administration of my estate.
(5) I do not attempt to devise the home in which we live or our joint bank
account, as these are held as estates by the entirety and will belong to her
upon my death, independent of my will.
The foregoing legacies are to be hers absolutely, but if she predeceases me the
same shall lapse and become a part of my residuary estate.
IV.
All the rest, residue, and remainder of my adjusted gross estate, both real and
personal wherever situated, I divide into two parts, one to be known as the marital
deduction, hereinafter referred to as the "Marital Trust," and the other to be known
as the "Residuary Trust."
The Marital Trust is for the benefit of my wife, MARY DOE,3 and it shall
consist of fifty per cent (50%)4 of the value of my adjusted gross estate as finally
determined for federal estate tax purposes, less the aggregate amount of marital
deductions, if any, allowed for such tax purposes by reason of other property or
interests in other property passing to her under other provisions of this will, or
which have already passed to her or for her benefit prior to my death, or which
may pass or which might have already passed to her by operation of law,5 it being
my intention that my wife shall have the maximum value in assets that may be

3The marital deduction is allowable for either husband or wife. INT.

REV. CODE

1954, §2056.
4The marital deduction can be any portion of the adjusted gross estate up to
50%, and it may be given outright or put in trust for the surviving spouse. The
trust must provide that the surviving spouse shall have all the income from it,
payable annually or more often, and the spouse must be given an exclusive, general
power of appointment over the marital trust. The same rule applies to any portion
of the marital deduction placed in trust.
5Examples of property transfers from husband to wife that may be taxed in
the husband's estate and may be subject to the marital deduction, though not
passing to the wife either under the will or by operation of law, are the following:
OF
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deducted from my estate as the marital deduction regardless of whether this increases the estate tax on the Residuary Trust or not. When said marital trust assets
are delivered to the trustee, hereinafter named, any increase in value thereof and
any interest or income earned thereupon, between the date selected for determination
of the value of my estate for estate tax purposes and the date of the delivery of
the marital trust assets to the trustee, shall belong to said Marital Trust.6 Any depredation in value of said marital trust assets between said dates shall be borne by
the Marital Trust.
Except for that portion of the Marital Trust passing by operation of law or by
other provisions of this will, as above explained, the executor shall have full authority and discretion to satisfy the said Marital Trust out of the assets of my estate
wholly or partly in cash or in kind, and to select and designate the cash, securities,
or other assets, including real estate, which shall constitute said marital trust assets.
In no event shall there be included in said Marital Trust any asset or proceeds of
the sale of any asset with respect to which a marital deduction would not be allowable if so included. The exercise by the executor of the authority and discretion hereby conferred shall not be subject to question by any person.
The part of my estate above referred to as the "Marital Trust" I give, bequeath,
and devise to my brother, THOMAS R. DOE,7 as trustee, in trust for the purposes
hereinafter set forth. Said trustee shall have all the powers allowed to testamentary
trustees under sections 691.03 and 691.04 of the Florida Statutes of 1955, as well as
such other powers as may be authorized by the laws of the State of Florida at the
time of my death. In addition to or in support of such powers, I authorize said
trustee:
(1) To receive, hold, exchange, manage, and control said trust property
(1) Gifts during lifetime that are held to have been made in contemplation
of death.
(2) Transfers that reserve a life estate in the husband. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§2036.
(3) Lifetime transfers that take effect at the husband's death. INT. REv. CODE
oF 1954, §2037.

(4) Lifetime transfers that could be revoked or otherwise changed by the
husband up to the time of his death. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2038.
(5) Survivorship annuities. Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2039.
(6) Lifetime transfers for an insufficient consideration. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §2043.
All of the foregoing are properties that have already passed to the wife. They are
included in the adjusted gross estate of the husband and should therefore be deducted from the property passing into the Marital Trust, since each of them qualifies
for the marital deduction.
eThis can be modified, if the testator so desires, by providing that the marital
deduction shall be valued as of the date selected for the determination of the
estate tax-date of death or one year from that date.
71t is usually better to name a bank or trust company as trustee or co-trustee,
since an individual trustee may die or become incapacitated.
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in his reasonable discretion for the benefit of this trust.
(2) To hold the same, or any part thereof, in cash from time to time, and
to invest, reinvest, or keep the same invested in such income-bearing
securities or other property, real or personal, as the trustee may deem
advisable in his reasonable discretion, and to collect the income therefrom for the benefit of this trust and to dispose of said income as required by the provisions of this will.
(3) To have and to exercise full power to sell, exchange, lease, or otherwise
dispose of, from time to time in his discretion for the benefit of this
trust, all or any portion of the trust estate in the manner and upon such
terms as the trustee may, in the exercise of his judgment and discretion,
deem most beneficial to the trust estate.
(4) In the exercise of the powers and authority herein conferred for the
benefit of this trust, the trustee is empowered, as often as may be necessary
in his discretion, to invest, sell, encumber, or exchange, for cash or upon
terms, without the order of any court, any part or all of the assets of the
trust estate, either publicly or privately, with or without notice by publication or otherwise; no purchaser shall be required to see to the application of the purchase money.
(5) I hereby authorize the trustee to invest in securities other than those
fixed by the statutes of the state of my domicile at the time of my death
for the investment of trust funds, and I expressly relieve the trustee from
any liability for depredation in holding in his discretion any nonlegal
investments owned by me at the time of my death.
(6) After paying all taxes and all costs of administering the Marital Trust,
including reasonable trustee's fees and other charges and expenses incident to the care, operation, and maintenance of said Marital Trust, the
trustee, commencing with the date of his qualification, shall pay all of
the net income from said Marital Trust to my said wife in quarterannual installments, or in more frequent installments in the discretion of
the trustee, for the duration of this trust. My wife shall also be entitled
to all net income earned from said marital trust assets from the date
of my death to the date of the qualification of the trustee, and the same
shall be paid to her by the executor or by the trustee in accordance with
the law in force at the time of my death.
My wife is given the full and exclusive power to appoint the entire assets of
the Marital Trust,8 free of this trust, to herself or to her estate; she may make such

STo qualify for the marital deduction, the power must be general and the surviving spouse must be given the exclusive right to exercise it. If the power of appointment is not general, the trust does not qualify for the marital deduction.
The will or other trust instrument must provide that the power must be exercised
exclusively by the surviving spouse; it may provide that the exercise may be solely
by deed or other form of transfer executed during life, that the exercise may be
solely by will, that a portion of the trust assets may be appointed during life and
the balance by will, and that if the powers are not exercised the trust assets shall
be disposed of as directed by the testator or donor.
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appointment by will or by deed or by other form of transfer to any person, corporation, association, educational institution, church, or charity, jointly or severally,
including her own creditors or the creditors of her estate, as she may desire. The
singular number thus used in describing the possible beneficiaries of such appointment shall be construed to include the plural number also, and the plural number
shall also be construed to include the singular number. My wife is also given the
exclusive power to appoint from time to time any portion or portions of said
marital trust assets by deed or other form of transfer and the remaining portion
thereof by will.
If my said wife fails to make such appointment or appointments, then said
marital trust property, or any portion not appointed at her death, shall become a
part of the Residuary Trust created by the terms of this will and shall be administered accordingly.9
If my said wife does not survive me, the assets of the Marital Trust above
bequeathed shall be added to the Residuary Trust.
V.
After the Marital Trust has been set apart, all the rest, residue, and remainder
of my estate shall constitute the "Residuary Trust"; and I give, bequeath, and devise
said residuary trust assets to my brother, THOMAS R. ROE, as trustee, in trust for
the purposes hereinafter set forth. Said trustee shall have all the powers allowed to
testamentary trustees under sections 691.03 and 691.04 of the Florida Statutes of
1955, as well as such other powers as may be authorized by the laws of the State of
Florida at the time of my death. In addition to or in support of such powers, I
authorize said trustee to exercise any or all of the powers above specified in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive, of Item IV of this will.
VI.
I authorize the trustee to pay all taxes and all costs of administering the Residuary Trust, including reasonable trustee's fees and other charges and expenses
incident to the care, operation, and maintenance of said residuary trust estate.
After paying all of said items, the trustee shall pay the net income to my wife,
MARY DOE, quarter-annually or more often in the discretion of the trustee, until
her death or remarriage. In the event of her death or remarriage, or in the event
of her election to take dower, then the remaining assets of said residuary trust estate
shall continue to be held in trust and administered for the benefit of the beneficiaries as specified in Item VII of this will until the termination of this trust.
In the event my wife accepts the provisions of this will, then I desire that she
shall have all the income from this Residuary Trust during her lifetime or until
her remarriage.
In the event my wife does not remarry, and in the opinion of the trustee the
income from said Residuary Trust is insufficient to support and maintain her in
her accustomed manner of living, then the trustee may encroach upon the corpus

The average testator prefers not to give his wife a power to dispose of the
assets of the marital trust during life, as she is usually not well versed in business
affairs.
9The residuary trust may be for the exclusive benefit of the children of the
trustor or for others. The marital trust must be solely for the surviving spouse.
The residuary assets need not be put in trust and may be devised outright.
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of the residuary trust assets to any extent he may think necessary for such purpose.
VII.
In the event of the death or remarriage of my wife before all of my children
have reached the age of twenty-one (21), this Residuary Trust shall not terminate,
but all the rights of her estate and all her rights in it shall cease, and it shall continue for the benefit of the beneficiaries until my youngest child has reached the
age of twenty-one (21), at which time it shall terminate and division of the remaining portion of the residuary trust assets shall then be made to the beneficiaries
in the manner set forth in this paragraph of my will. If my wife does not die or
remarry until after my youngest child has reached the age of twenty-one (21),
then the said Residuary Trust shall continue until her death or remarriage, at
which time it shall terminate and final distribution shall be made. It is my will and
desire that my children shall share equally in the final distribution of the residuary
trust assets. The spouse and lineal descendents of any deceased child of mine shall,
at the termination of this Residuary Trust, be entitled to the share of such deceased
child per stirpes, the spouse taking a child's part in such share. I have only four
children now, but the terms of this will also include any child of mine hereafter
born.
I direct the trustee in the management and control of the Residuary Trust to
refrain from delivering the share of any minor who may become entitled during
his or her minority to share under the terms of this will in the distribution of either
the principal or the income, or both, of the residuary trust assets until such minor
is entitled to receive the same as above provided. The trustee may advance for
the use of such minor as much of either the principal or the income, or both, to
which such minor may become entitled as the trustee in his absolute discretion
may deen proper for the education, maintenance, and support of such minor; but
such advances shall be charged against the interest of such minor in the said
Residuary Trust. The trustee in his discretion may make payments of any income
or principal so applied to the use of a minor by making such payments to a parent
or the guardian of such minor or by applying the same for the benefit of such
minor. The receipt of such parent or guardian or other evidence of the proper
expenditure of such money for the benefit of such minor shall be a full and
sufficient discharge of the trustee for any such advancement, whether or not there
is any legal guardian for such minor at the time of any such advancement.
During the minority of any beneficiary, if it so happen that such beneficiary
becomes entitled to any income from the Residuary Trust or to any portion of the
principal thereof, the trustee may accumulate the same for the benefit of such
minor; or the trustee, in his absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may advance
the same or any portion of it, as above provided, for the education, maintenance,
and support of such minor.
As each of the minor beneficiaries of this Residuary Trust reaches the age of
twenty-one (21), if my wife has died or remarried the trustee is authorized, in his
discretion, to deliver to such beneficiary thus reaching majority a portion of the
principal of said residuary trust assets. The amount of such advancement shall be
in the discretion of the trustee, and such advancement shall be charged against
the interest of such beneficiary in the residuary trust assets. If a beneficiary dies
while a minor, after receiving any advancements allowed by the terms of this will,
the estate of such minor shall be relieved from repayment of such advancements.
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In the event all of my children and their lineal descendants shall be dead at the
time of my death, then this trust shall not arise, and all said residuary trust assets
shall belong to my wife, if she is then living, absolutely and in fee simple.
In the event my wife and all my lineal descendants should predecease me, then
it is my desire that fifty per cent (50%) of this residuary trust estate shall be divided equally between my mother and father or be delivered to the survivor of
them. If both predecease me, then said fifty per cent (50%) shall descend per
stirpes to my collateral relatives according to the laws of descent and distribution
of the State of Florida. The other fifty per cent (50%) I give, bequeath, and devise
to the UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, Coral Gables, Florida, to be used in such manner
as the board of trustees of said university may deem proper.
VIII.
In the event of the illness of my wife, MARY DOE, or of any one of my children,
I authorize the trustee, in his discretion, out of the income or principal, or both,
of the residuary trust assets, to make provisions for my said wife or for such child
during such illness from time to time as he may think necessary. He may likewise
make such provisions for the children of any deceased or sick child of mine. Any such
provisions, except those for my said wife, made under this power shall be charged
as an advancement to the beneficiary receiving the same; but I relieve the trustee
from making such charge if he, in his discretion, thinks proper to do so under the
circumstances. The provisions of this Item VIII of my will do not apply to my wife if
she remarries, as she has complete power to appoint the assets of the Marital Trust,
as hereinbefore provided by the terms of this will.
IX.
In the event my wife and I should die in a common disaster so that it is impossible to determine which died first, then this will shall continue in force in the
same manner as though my wife has survived me. If my whole family should die
with me in the same disaster and it is impossible to determine which survived,
then all my property shall be disposed of in the manner specified in the last
paragraph of Item VII of this will.
X.
I hereby nominate and appoint my brother, THOMAS R. DOE,10 as executor
and trustee under this will, to act in any jurisdiction where he is lawfully entitled
to act, in either or both capacities, without any bond or other security.
I confer upon said executor full authority and power to sell or lease any part
or all of my estate, at public or private sale, with or without notice, as he may
deem best, and without any order of court. I authorize him to make good and
sufficient conveyances to the purchaser and to hold the proceeds of any sale to the
same uses and trusts as hereinbefore declared in the several items of this, my
will. In the event it becomes necessary for the executor or trustee to borrow money
for the use of my estate in any instance in which he thinks it proper and necessary,
I expressly confer upon him the authority to borrow such funds as may be necessary, and to secure the same by mortgage or trust deed upon any part of my estate;
this he may do without an order of any court.
I confer the same full powers on him as trustee, when he takes charge of the
trust property bequeathed and devised under this will.

loSee note 7 supra.
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Whenever used in this will, the term "executor" and the term "trustee" shall
include any successor or successors.
I hereby confer upon said executor all the rights, powers, duties, and exemptions
hereby conferred upon him as trustee, and I confer upon him as trustee all rights,
powers, duties, and exemptions hereby conferred upon him as executor under the
terms of this will.
In the event my brother, THOMAS R. DOE, should predecease me, or in the
event he should fail to qualify or should resign or die during the administration of
my estate or of said trust, then it is my will and desire that my wife, MARY DOE,
and THE NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA,
act as successor co-executors and co-trustees with the same rights, privileges, and
powers as hereinbefore conferred upon my brother as executor and as trustee.
This April 30, 1956.
(Seal)
JOHN DOE
The foregoing instrument was signed, sealed, declared, and published by John
Doe as his last will and testament, in the presence of us, the undersigned, who, at
his special instance and request, do attest as witnesses, after said testator has
signed his name hereto, and in his presence, and in the presence of each other.
This April 30, 1956.
/s/

ZEON DOMEK

/sl E. 0. SIMON
/s/

MARY N. ETTIE

Miami, Florida
Miami, Florida
Miami, Floridall

IlOnly two witnesses are necessary in Florida, but it is always best to have three,
since the testator may later move to another state where three witnesses are required, or he may own real estate in a state where three witnesses are necessary
to the validity of a will transferring real estate.
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